The State of Utah v. Vernon E. Clifford : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
The State of Utah v. Vernon E. Clifford : Reply Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Catherine L. Begic; Matthew G. Nielsen; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Trina A. Higgins; Deputy District Attorney; David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County District Attorney;
Attorneys for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Clifford, No. 970681 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1216
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
VERNON E. CLIFFORD, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970681-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm in a Vehicle, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1995), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County (Murray Department), State of 
Utah, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto and the Honorable Michael K. 
Burton, Judges, presiding. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC (7746) 
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN (7267) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 E. 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
TRINA A. HIGGINS (7349) 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
2001 S. State, Suite 3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Attorneys for Appellee 
UTAH COURTOF APPEALS 
UTAH R , € F 
DOCUMENT 
'££%%• 
'>}& 
u 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. _ 5 f 
FILED 
Utah Cni*«* ^ Anneals 
UH ly i 
JuHa D'A^-wmdro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
VERNON E. CLIFFORD, : Case No. 970681-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm in a Vehicle, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1995), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County (Murray Department), State of 
Utah, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto and the Honorable Michael K. 
Burton, Judges, presiding. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC (7746) 
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN (7267) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 E. 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
TRINA A. HIGGINS (7349) 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
2001 S. State, Suite 3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i i 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE STATE 
TO PRODUCE THE WRITTEN INVENTORY SEARCH POLICY. . . . 1 
A. To the Extent That the Trial Court Employed a 
Rule 1002 Analysis, It Is Bound to Apply It 
Correctly and to Require the State to Produce the 
Written Policy for Inventory Searches. . . . 1 
B. The Written Policy Was Required to Ensure the 
Reliability of Critical Evidence Concerning 
Inventory Search Policy. 5 
II. EVEN IF A RULE 1002 ANALYSIS IS NOT APPLICABLE, 
THE INVENTORY SEARCH WOULD STILL FAIL SINCE THE 
OFFICER DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE FOLLOWED A 
STANDARDIZED PROCEDURE. 7 
A. Blanton Did Not Demonstrate a Certain 
Knowledge of Inventory Search Procedure. 7 
B. Blanton's Testimony Did Not Establish That He 
Followed an Inventory Search Policy. R 
III. THE INVENTORY SEARCH IS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS 
CONDUCTED AS A PRETEXT TO AN INVESTIGATORY POLICE 
MOTIVE. 11 
CONCLUSION . L4 
ORAL ARGUMENT 14 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 
111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) 6 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 
65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) 6 
South Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 
S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) 10, 11, 12 
State By and Through Utah State Department of 
Social Services v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 
114 (Utah App. 1987) 4 
State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987) 6 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983) 12 
State v. Hvgh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 11, 12 
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987) 12 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) 4 
State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991) 4 
State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah 1993) 4 
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 
1988) 8 
S t a t e v . S t r i c k l i n g , 844 P . 2 d 979 (Utah App. 
1992) 7 , 8, 9, 
10 , 11 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 12, 13 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 5 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 5 
Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (1998) 1, 4 
ii 
Page 
Utah R. Evid. 1101 (1998) 1 
Utah R. Evid. 1002 (1998) 1, 2, 3 
4, 5, 7 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
McCormick et al., McCormick On Evidence § 231 
(2d ed. 1972) 3 
3 Wayne R. LeFave, Search and Seizure § 7.4(a) 
at 109 (2d ed. 1987) 8 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
VERNON E. CLIFFORD, : Case No. 970681-CA 
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Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE STATE TO 
PRODUCE THE WRITTEN INVENTORY SEARCH POLICY. 
A. To the Extent That the Trial Court Employed a Rule 1002 
Analysis, it Is Bound to Apply it Correctly and to Require 
the State to Produce the Written Policy for Inventory 
Searches. 
The State asserts that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to require the written policy of the Sheriff's 
Department regarding inventory searches pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Evidence 10 02 (1998) since the rules of evidence are not 
applicable at suppression hearings. See State's Brief ("S.B.") 
at 7; see also Utah R. Evid. 1101 (1998); Utah R. Evid. 104(a) 
(1998).1 However, the trial court did err in admitting the 
Utah R. Evid. 1101(b) provides: 
The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not 
apply [to] . . . (1) preliminary questions of fact which are 
to be determined under Rule 104 (a) . 
Utah R. Evid. 104(a) provides: 
Preliminary questions concerning the . . . admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court. . . . In making its 
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except 
those with respect to privileges. 
1 
evidence under Rule 1002 to the extent that all parties involved -
the court, the State, and Clifford - engaged in a Rule 1002 
analysis and the court rendered a decision that was erroneous. 
At the suppression hearing, the State elicited testimony 
from Deputy Blanton ("Blanton"), the searching officer, regarding 
his understanding of the written procedures for an inventory 
search. R.MH12. The following colloquy and ruling occurred with 
regard to Clifford's Rule 1002 challenge: 
Clifford: Your Honor, I'm going to object. I don't think 
this officer can testify as to the department's procedure, 
and that's because under Rule 1002 of the Rules of Evidence 
-- known as the Best Evidence Rule -- if [] the state is 
attempting to offer the contents of a writing, they must 
produce that writing itself. [The State is] asking the 
officer to testify as to their written [] procedure or 
policy . . . they need to introduce that written policy or 
procedure 
Court: How do we know it's written? 
Clifford: We don't . . . can I voir dire [Blanton]? 
Court: If you w a n t . . . . 
VOIR DIRE 
Clifford: Does the Sheriff's Department have a written 
policy or procedure . . . for search and seizure? 
Blanton: They do. 
Clifford: And were you acting pursuant to that policy and 
procedure? 
Blanton: I was. . . . 
Court: And so your (Clifford) objection is what? 
Clifford: That they have to introduce the written policy . 
. . to establish . . . what the procedure is. . . . 
State: Your Honor, I believe that he has been trained in 
such. . . . I'll lay some foundation for that. 
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Court: So you (Clifford) think this is Rule 1002 or 
something? 
Clifford: 1002. 
Court: 1002. And you (the State) think you can create some 
foundation for it? 
State: Your Honor, I would ask to lay a foundation by 
asking the officer if he's been trained by these policies 
and what his training was: what it was that he was taught to 
do. 
Court: So you're not going to worry about what the policy 
is, but you're going to ask him what he was trained to do? 
State: Right. His understanding of the policy. 
Court: And would you (Clifford) object to that? 
Clifford: I would. [Be]cause his understanding of the 
policy is what the policy says, and I think the best 
evidence of that is is [sic] the policy itself. 
Court: Well, clearly, yeah, his understanding wouldn't be 
what it says; it would be his understanding. So we'll go 
ahead and let him testify as to what his understanding is. 
R.MH12-15. 
It is clear from the above colloquy that all parties engaged 
in an articulate Rule 1002 argument. Id. Above all, it is 
evident that the judge rendered a decision based on those 
arguments, especially since he employed the typical language of a 
Rule 1002 analysis (i.e., refusing to require written policy 
because Blanton would be testifying only to his "understanding" 
of the policy and not the policy itself). R.MH15; see, e.g. 
McCormick et al., McCormick On Evidence § 231 (2d ed. 1972) 
(discussing Best Evidence Rule implications when witness 
testifies as to "recollection" of contents of writing). 
To the extent that the parties presented arguments in terms 
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of Rule 1002, and the trial court ruled on those arguments, it's 
decision is reviewable on that basis. The Utah Supreme Court in 
other contexts has held that an issue is reviewable, although not 
properly before the trial court, where the judge nonetheless 
rules on the issue on its merits. See,e.g. State v. Johnson, 821 
P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (" [b]ecause the trial court addressed 
the corpus delicti issue fully and did not rely on waiver, we 
consider the issue on appeal, even though trial counsel failed to 
properly preserve it as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 
103(a) (1)") (citing State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 
1991)); see also State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993). 
This is so because "the trial court ha[d] the first opportunity 
to address a claim that it erred." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. 
Given that the trial court here decided the Rule 1002 issue on 
its merits, its decision is subject to review on that basis as 
well. 
The trial court's decision is reviewable under Rule 1002 for 
the added reason that it did so erroneously. "While Utah R. 
Evid. 104(a) does not require the [trial] court to apply the 
Rules of Evidence to questions of admissibility of evidence 
generally, the court is not bound to disregard those rules." 
State By and Through Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. 
Ruscetta 742 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah App. 1987) (trial court did not 
abuse discretion in applying Utah Rules of Evidence to issue of 
unavailability of witness). To the extent that the court does 
utilize the rules, it is bound to do so correctly and uniformly 
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in order to avoid arbitrary application of the law. See U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV - Equal Protection Clause (requiring that 
similarly situated individuals be treated alike under the law 
unless there is a reasonable basis for treating them 
differently); Utah Const, art. I, § 24 - Uniform Operation of 
Laws (same). Given that the court opted to apply a Rule 1002 
analysis, its ruling is subject to review to the extent that it 
misconstrued the necessity for the written procedure under that 
rule. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court's decision should 
not be affirmed simply because it was not bound to apply the 
evidentiary rules. To the extent that it engaged in a Rule 1002 
analysis and did so erroneously, it's decision is, in fact, 
reviewable on that basis.2 Moreover, requiring the State to 
provide the written policy was the only method of insuring the 
inherent reliability of such critical evidence. 
B. The Written Policy Was Required To Ensure The 
Reliability Of Critical Evidence Concerning Inventory Search 
Policy. 
The trial court's erroneous refusal to require the written 
policy is likewise reviewable on the basis that, without the 
written document, the trial court did not ensure the inherent 
As to the Rule 1002 issue on appeal, the State only 
asserts that the court was not bound by the rule and hence did 
not abuse its discretion in failing to require the written 
policy. S.B.7-8. The State does not discuss why the ruling was 
correct under Rule 1002. Id. Accordingly, Clifford submits on 
his opening brief regarding the trial court's error in not 
requiring the written policy pursuant to Rule 1002. See 
Appellant's Opening Brief ("A.B.") at 9-15. 
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reliability of evidence going to the critical issue of whether a 
policy existed and whether Blanton followed it. 
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "[a]lthough not bound by 
the Rules of Evidence in a suppression hearing, a trial judge 
must weigh the reliability . . . of material presented to aid in 
the decision to admit or exclude evidence." State v. Branch, 743 
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987). Put another way, the judge may not 
admit evidence that does not bear "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 
2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805, 815, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). 
In the present case, Blanton's testimony standing alone did 
not bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio, 
448 U.S. at 66. As the searching officer, an agent of the 
government, and the prosecution's primary witness, Blanton had an 
interest in relaying his understanding of the inventory search 
procedure in a light most favorable to his actions and in a 
manner that would promote admission of the gun. Moreover, given 
the inherent weakness of human recall, Blanton's testimony 
regarding his understanding of the procedure risked that he would 
mistransmit what the policy actually stated. 
Given the risks and weaknesses of Blanton's recollected 
testimony, the trial court erred in failing to compel the State 
to produce the written policy. The written document, in contrast 
to Blanton's testimony, would have provided the court with 
accurate information going to a dispositive issue, namely the 
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existence of and Blanton's adherence to a standard inventory 
search procedure. Absent the written document, the judge was 
left to sift through Blanton's testimony alone in determining the 
validity of this inventory search, thereby compromising the 
truth-finding function of the judge. 
In light of the foregoing, this Court should review the 
trial court's clearly erroneous refusal to compel the State to 
produce the written inventory search procedure. 
II. EVEN IF A RULE 1002 ANALYSIS IS NOT APPLICABLE, THE 
INVENTORY SEARCH WOULD STILL FAIL SINCE THE OFFICER DID NOT 
ESTABLISH THAT HE FOLLOWED A STANDARDIZED PROCEDURE. 
A. Blanton Did Not Demonstrate A Certain Knowledge Of 
Inventory Search Procedure. 
The State cites this Court's opinion in State v. Stricklinq, 
844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992) for the proposition that a 
searching officer need only testify about department inventory 
search policy in order for the prosecution to meet its burden to 
establish such procedure. S.B.9. 
The State, however, oversimplifies the Stricklinq decision. 
Stricklinq actually requires that an officer's testimony 
regarding inventory search procedure must demonstrate a "certain 
knowledge" and be "probative" of the issue. 844 P.2d at 990; see 
also A.B.15. Contrary to the State's assertion, Officer 
Blanton's testimony is not analogous to that of the officer who 
testified in Stricklinq and thus does not meet these criteria. 
Indeed, far from evincing a "close familiarity with [inventory 
search] policies," S.B.10, Blanton's testimony is distinguishable 
from the much more detailed information offered by the officer in 
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Strickling in that it is too generalized to be probative of 
whether and to what extent an inventory search procedure existed. 
See A.B.15-17 (discussing how Blanton's testimony falls short of 
demonstrating "probative," "certain knowledge" of inventory 
search policy). 
In addition to misconstruing the Strickling requirements for 
officer testimony, the State also ignores the fact that Blanton 
testified that he is authorized to conduct inventory searches 
according to his own discretion even though some rules are in 
place. R.MH31. Discretionary authority implies that there is, 
in effect, no binding policy and runs counter to the trial 
court's finding that a policy existed. R.MH43. Indeed, the fact 
that Blanton may exercise discretion in conducting an inventory 
search flies in the face the very rationale for requiring a 
standardized policy in the first place, namely to "guard[] 
against arbitrariness when police conduct warrantless inventory 
searches." Strickling, 844 P.2d at 987-88 (citing 3 Wayne R. 
LeFave, Search And Seizure § 7.4(a) at 109 (2d ed. 1987); State 
v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah App. 1988)). 
In light of the foregoing, the State's argument is not 
compelling. In fact, the trial court clearly erred in 
determining that the search at issue here was conducted pursuant 
to . . . policy," R.MH43, where such finding goes "against the 
clear weight of the evidence" presented below. Strickling, 844 
P.2d at 981. 
B. Blanton7s Testimony Did Not Establish That He Followed 
An Inventory Search Policy. 
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The State additionally asserts that Blanton's testimony 
established that he followed a policy in carrying out the 
inventory search of Clifford's car. S.B.10-13. In so arguing, 
the State looks at the facts of this case in isolation. 
Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, however, the 
facts actually establish that Blanton did not adhere to any sort 
of policy in conducting this search. Assuming but not conceding 
that an inventory search procedure was established, Blanton's 
testimony indicated that he complied with such policy only to the 
extent that his discretion did not direct him to do otherwise. 
See supra Point II.A. 
Moreover, as Blanton himself admitted, he carried out the 
inventory search only insofar as he looked in the passenger area 
and in the driver's side door pouch. R.MH11. Although Blanton 
acknowledged that the primary purpose of an inventory is to 
secure personal property and avoid false claims of theft, he 
failed to look in obvious areas of the truck where valuables are 
likely to be found, such as the glove compartment or in the bed 
of the truck. R.MH26-27,34; see also Stricklinq, 844 P.2d at 
986. In addition, Blanton testified that he is required to make 
a written list of all the items he finds during an inventory. 
R.MH3 0. Nonetheless, he did not complete the state impound tax 
form, listing only the contraband found, such as the gun and 
three open beer containers, but not Clifford's tools, which might 
have been the subject of a later claim of theft. R.MH10,25,27. 
Blanton's failure to adhere to a standard policy runs 
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counter to the purpose and justification of inventory searches. 
As noted by this Court in Stricklincr, 
[i]nventory searches . . . constitute an exception to the 
warrant requirement because such a search is not conducted 
to investigate criminal activity and no variant of 
individualized suspicion is necessary to permit one. 
Instead, police conduct such inventory searches to protect 
property in the car, to protect police against the claim of 
theft, and to protect police form potential danger. 
844 P.2d at 986 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 
369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). Where Blanton 
failed to adhere to any sort of policy, there were not sufficient 
assurances that this warrantless intrusion into Clifford7 s 
privacy was not "limited in scope to the extent necessary to 
carry out the caretaking function." Id. at 988 (citing Opperman, 
428 U.S. at 375). 
Nonetheless, the State dismisses Blanton's failure to adhere 
to policy on the basis that his attention was turned toward 
Clifford's arrest after the gun was discovered and that another 
officer stepped in to complete the inventory. S.B.11-13. 
However, such glaring deficits in this inventory cannot be cured 
by these facts alone. If anything, they reveal Blanton's 
investigatory motive and his haste to arrest Clifford. See infra 
Point III; A.B.Point III (discussing invalidity of inventory 
search under pretext doctrine). If Blanton was sincerely 
conducting an inventory, he could have put Clifford in the care 
of the other officer present while he completed the search 
himself. At the very least, he could have listed the tools he 
found during the course of his portion of the search. R.MH27. 
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Absent any indicia of sincerity, however, the trial court's 
finding that Blanton adhered to procedure, R.MH43, as well as the 
State's argument on appeal, lack merit. 
III. THE INVENTORY SEARCH IS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS 
CONDUCTED AS A PRETEXT TO AN INVESTIGATORY POLICE MOTIVE. 
The State agrees with Clifford that the "inventory search 
exception to the requirement of a warrant does not apply when the 
inventory search is actually a pretext to an 'investigatory 
police motive.'" S.B.13 (quoting State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
268 (Utah 1985)). The State notes further that "[t]he existence 
of regularized procedures for handling inventory searches play a 
role identical to that of search warrants in guarding against 
arbitrariness in who and what officers select to search. 
Inventories that were not conducted in compliance with department 
policies should not be upheld under Qpperman." S.B.13 (citing 
Strickling, 844 P.2d at 987); see, e.g., A.B.n.9. To the extent 
that neither a standard policy nor Blanton's adherence thereto 
was established, see supra Point II; A.B. Point II, this search 
is invalid. 
Although Clifford submits on his opening brief, see A.B. 
Point III, in response to the State's argument that this was not 
a pretextual inventory search, a few added comments bear 
mentioning. As an initial matter, the State challenges 
Clifford's reliance on Hygh for the proposition that Blanton's 
failure to involve Clifford in the disposition of his belongings 
prior to initiating an inventory search is indicative of pretext. 
S.B.15. The State distinguishes Hygh on the basis that the 
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officer in that case was required to question the defendant about 
his valuables and, in failing to do so, "deviated from department 
procedure." S.B.15. The State alternatively cites State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987), for the argument that 
Blanton was not required under the Fourth Amendment to give 
Clifford the opportunity to make arrangements for his valuables. 
S.B.16. To the extent that Blanton was not required by either 
policy or the constitution to give Clifford such opportunity, the 
state argues that his failure to do so is not indicative of 
pretext. 
While the State's reading of Hvah and Johnson is technically 
correct, it misses the overall lesson to be learned from other 
cases touching on this topic. As noted in Opperman, the greater 
inquiry concerns the reasonableness of the inventory search. 428 
U.S. at 373. Whether a particular act is required by the Fourth 
Amendment or standardized policy is not the end of the inquiry. 
See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375 (without discussing 
procedure or specific acts mandated by the Fourth Amendment, 
Court held inventory search was not pretextual where defendant 
was "not present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping 
of his belongings"); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983) 
(without discussing procedure, Court determines inventory search 
is not pretextual because officers "allowed Cole to take an 
personal items . . . prior to the inventory" even though it is 
not constitutionally required). Accordingly, evidence that an 
officer gave a defendant the opportunity to dispose of his own 
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belongings prior to initiating an impound and inventory search 
becomes a mark of reasonableness for purposes of a pretext 
analysis where the policy or Fourth Amendment jurisprudence do 
not otherwise prescribe it. Hence, the State's contention on 
appeal is unfounded; Blanton's failure to involve Clifford in the 
disposition of his truck and belongings, although not required by 
either policy or Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is indicative of 
his pretextual motive. 
In any event, the State contends that Blanton could not have 
given Clifford this option since Clifford was an uninsured driver 
and his companion was inebriated. S.B.16. Contrary to the 
State's assertion, however, the circumstances of the present case 
indicate that it would have been reasonable and entirely 
practicable for Blanton to give Clifford a chance to dispose of 
his property. As noted in his opening brief, Clifford was at 
liberty to make other arrangements if Blanton had allowed him to 
do so. A.B.25. Clifford was not yet under arrest at the time 
Blanton initiated the search and he had a cell phone from which 
he could call family or a friend to remove the truck. R.MH27-
28,31. Moreover, the evidence does not otherwise indicate that 
allowing Clifford to make arrangements at this time would have 
been impracticable for Blanton. 
In light of the foregoing, Blanton's failure to allow 
Clifford to make arrangements for his truck and his belongings 
was unreasonable and highlights his pretextual motive. Based on 
the discussion herein and in Clifford's opening brief, A.B. Point 
13 
Ill, the trial court erred in finding that the inventory search 
at issue was not invalid as a pretext to an investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the argument set forth in his 
opening brief, Clifford respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's order admitting the illegally seized 
gun, reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the case to 
allow Clifford to withdraw his guilty plea. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument. 
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